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ARTICLES




Intellectual and technological revolutions of the past have
fundamentally changed the way we live and vastly expanded the amount
of knowledge we can master. The Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution
and the Information Age each represent a "great leap forward" in human
potential. The Genetic Age promises another exponential increase in
human knowledge and potential.
With this new age there is also vast potential for harm. We must not
forget Jesse Gelsinger, an eighteen-year-old who volunteered as a subject
in a study at the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Gene Therapy
(the Institute), which at that time was considered the leading program in
the nation.' The most common method for delivering DNA for gene
therapy is by weakened adenoviruses. On September 13, 1999,
researchers at the Institute inoculated Jesse with a massive dose of
adenovirus.3 Jesse slipped into a coma and died four days later.4 Jesse's
mother said, "I have read that my son's death has been called by one of
* B.A., 1972, Yale University, J.D., 1977, Cornell Law School. McDowell Professor of
Law and Research Fellow, Constitutional Law Center, University of Akron School of
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1. See Judith A. Cregan, Light, Fast, and Flexible: A New Approach to
Regulation of Human Gene Therapy, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 261, 267 (2000);
Michael Baram, Making Clinical Trials Safer for Human Subjects, 27 AM. J.L. &
MED. 253,255-256 (2001).
2. "Success [of gene therapy], according to researchers, depends upon
effective delivery of the new genetic material into the target cells of the patient
using a vector, usually a disabled virus . Id. at 255. See also Gene Therapy
Touted as Cancer Fighter, NEWSDAY, February 27, 2001, at A42.
3. See Cregan, supra note 1, at 267. See also Joseph M. Rainsbury,
Biotechnology on the RAC - FDA/NIH Regulation of Human Gene Therapy, 55
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 575, 592-594 (2000).
4. See Cregan, supra note 1, at 267.
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the leaders in this field as a pothole on the road to gene therapy. His
death was no pothole. It was an avoidable tragedy from which I will never
fully recover."5  Neither Jesse nor his family was told of the researchers'
personal financial interest in the gene therapy trials.6 In addition, the
resulting investigation revealed "serious deficiencies" in the way that the
Institute monitored its study The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
halted gene therapy trials at the University of Pennsylvania8 and a dozen
other institutions.9 Congress is presently considering legislation that will
provide additional protections for subjects of medical experimentation, as
well as require the disclosure of any financial interest researchers have in
the products they are testing.l
There is, however, an even more serious impending risk. In 2001, Panos
Zavos, a Ph.D. who runs a Kentucky fertility clinic that does not
participate in voluntary programs that report success rates, and Severino
Aninori, the Italian obstetrician who helped a sixty two year old woman
become pregnant, announced plans to clone a human being, despite the
fact that ninety-five to ninety-seven percent of cloned animals are
deformed and often fail even to survive." Although Zavos and Aninori
5. Id. at 261.
6. The lead researcher, Dr. James Wilson, failed to disclose that he owned
thirty percent of Genovo, the company whose substance Wilson was testing.
David Heath and Duff Wilson, System's Serious Flaws Have Led Many to Call for
Regulatory Reform, THE SEATTLE TIMES, March 15, 2001, at All. Professor
Baram characterizes researchers' failure to disclose their financial interest in the
success of the trials as a "disturbing feature" of the violations at research
institutions conducting human clinical trials. Baram, supra note 1, at 256.
7. Cregan, supra note 1, at 267.
8. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Gene Therapy Trials Halted in Wake of Death, THE
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, January 22, 2000, at A10.
9. Cregan, supra note 1, at 267-68.
10. See Michael Kranish, System for protecting Humans in Research Faulted,
BOSTON GLOBE, March 25, 2002, at Al (describing legislation introduced by
Senator Edward Kennedy to overhaul the National Research Act).
11. See Rick Weiss, Human Cloning Bid Stirs Experts' Anger: Problems in
Animal Cases Noted, WASH. POST, March 7, 2001, at Al. Dr. Ian Wilmut and
Rudolf Jaenisch, who pioneered cloning with "Dolly" the sheep, stated: "[I]n the
case of attempted human cloning, it is not only the embryos that die early that are
troubling, but also those that will live to become abnormal children and adults."
TRANSPLANT NEWS, March 30, 2001, available at 2001 WL 12313874.
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are unlikely to receive funding for this research, there is no federal law
prohibiting these experiments. 2
Who will determine the future direction of genetic research? Who will
channel and limit the permissible applications of genetic technology?
Who will decide the scope and nature of societal regulation of this
revolutionary science? Will it be individual citizens and their physicians?
The biotechnology industry? Administrative agencies? Or judges and
elected officials?
The path of human progress is being plotted by our exploration of the
human genome, but it is vital that in the course of our discoveries we do
not permit the exploitation of human beings. In her recent book Future
Perfect, Lori Andrews offers three models of decisionmaking for the
allocation of genetic services: the medical model, the public health model
and the fundamental rights model.'3 She concludes that the fundamental
rights model will best protect the interests of individuals and society, both
medically and in terms of human dignity.'4
This article describes three frameworks the law uses to regulate genetic
technology: (1) Individual Rights and Duties; (2) Scientific Regulation by
Administrative Agencies; and (3) Legislative Preemption. Each
framework is invoked by a different decisionmaker and each imposes a
different level of scrutiny over genetic technology.
Actions to enforce Individual Rights and Duties are initiated by
individuals. This framework involves the lowest level of government
oversight over genetic technology. The core of this approach is to
establish legal rights for individual citizens under the traditional sources of
law: the common law, specific remedial statutes and the Constitution.
Under this framework people are free to act unless and until they harm
others. The law makes no attempt to prevent harm other than to deter it
by acknowledging the right of an affected person to sue for damages.
Scientific Regulation is conducted by administrative agencies and
results in a higher level of scrutiny over genetic technology. This is
12. The Food and Drug Administration does have authority to regulate
"drugs," "medical devices" and "biologic products," but its authority to regulate
cloning has been questioned. See infra notes 34 and 132 and accompanying text.
See generally Richard A. Merrill & Bryan J. Rose, FDA Regulation of Human
Cloning: Usurpation or Statesmanship?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2001).
Fashioning anti-cloning legislation is difficult in part because "the term 'cloning'
covers a variety of research techniques, including several that have been used
beneficially for many years," such as DNA testing or stem cell research. Id. at 132.
13. LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT 22-29 (2001).
14. Id. at 170-173.
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currently the most common form of regulating the biotechnology industry
in the United States. Nevertheless, our national experience has not
resulted in a very strict level of administrative oversight. Administrative
regulations take years to develop because each agency bears the burden of
justifying the regulations in court, and agency policy is subject to revision
by each new presidential administration. Adding to the difficulty is the
fact that administrative agencies in the United States have had to act
under existing laws that have not been amended to deal with the novel
challenges of genetic technology.
The highest level of oversight, Legislative Preemption, is essentially
hostile to genetic technology and would severely restrict the application of
this new science. The fundamental precept of this framework is "safety
first" - the precautionary principle. Under this regulatory framework the
government - usually the legislative branch - forbids or severely limits the
development and application of new technology until it is proven safe. But
because we do not yet know all of the consequences of genetic technology
- since it cannot be proven safe in advance - this type of precautionary
legislation operates as a virtual ban.
Each legal framework plays a critical role in regulating genetic
technology. Individual rights must be protected, industries must be
regulated and exploitative or dangerous practices banned. Furthermore,
observers have identified a number of reforms that should be adopted
within each framework. The law must enhance individual autonomy by
more clearly recognizing rights to genetic privacy and nondiscrimination.
Administrative agencies should adopt a more comprehensive regulatory
framework, with stricter controls over the applications of genetic
technology and stronger protections for human safety. Finally, the
legislature should ban exploitative and dangerous experiments.
I. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIEs
There are three sources of individual rights and duties: the common law
(that is, the decisions of the courts in fields such as torts, contracts,
property and family law); specific statutes creating private causes of
action; and state and federal constitutions. This article begins below with
the common law.
A. Common Law Rights and Duties
The common law framework of individual rights and duties is
historically the earliest legal framework, and it remains the dominant
[Vol. 19:1
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mechanism in the United States for regulating the medical profession and
health care institutions. 5 The legal consequence of substandard medical
performance is liability under the law of torts. This takes two principal
forms: actions for medical malpractice and actions for defective products.
To determine ownership of genetic products, courts use property, contract
and family law.
15. State boards of health license health care providers and in egregious cases
may suspend individuals or institutions that fall below state standards. However,
nongovernmental professional accreditation associations and credentialing
committees conduct most monitoring of health care providers. The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) accredits
approximately 5,400 hospitals. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY,
SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ,
HEALTH LAW 7 (1995). JCAHO is a private credentialing organization whose
standards and findings are accepted by state and federal authorities.
Most states have incorporated JCAHO accreditation standards, some
explicitly, into their hospital licensure standards. Some have accepted
JCAHO accreditation in lieu of a state license. Under the Medicare
statute, JCAHO-accredited hospitals are 'deemed' to have met
requirements for Medicare certification. Although the Secretary retains a
look-behind authority, JCAHO substitutes for the routine surveillance
process.
BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY
STOLTZFUS JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 139 (1997).
Physicians' hospital privileges are granted and suspended by credentialing
committees composed of the private physicians who comprise the medical
staff. The medical staff traditionally has held substantial authority over
the hospital's internal quality assurance system and its credentialing
process, which is the process through which physicians receive and
maintain privileges. Only the hospital's governing board has legal
authority to grant, deny, limit or revoke privileges, but it is the hospital's
medical staff that generally controls the credentialing process to that
ultimate point. The medical staff structure has allowed substantial
physician control over access to hospital privileges ....
Id. at 455. Federal oversight is largely limited to economic regulation of the health
care industry. The federal government has vigorously enforced a number of
economic measures against health care providers, including Medicare and
Medicaid fraud and abuse laws, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2000) (felony to make
false statement in a medical claim) and 42 U.S.C. § 1320a -7b(b) (2000) (felony to
solicit or receive remuneration in return for a patient referral); the Stark Bill, 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn(2000) (prohibiting self-referrals); the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1-2 (2000), (prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade and monopolization);
and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000) (prohibiting a range of anticompetitive
conduct).
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1. Medical Malpractice
The principal control mechanism governing the quality of health care in
the United States is the civil action for medical malpractice. Malpractice
litigation is more common in the United States than in other nations.6
The American Medical Association (AMA) has proposed replacing the
tort system with administrative determinations of medical liability and that
medical errors could be reduced by strengthening the licensing and
disciplinary powers of state medical boards. 7 However, this proposal has
not been adopted, and in the United States it is principally the fear of
malpractice liability that drives health care providers to adopt the latest
technology, as well as follow accepted clinical practice guidelines. 8
Over the past twenty-five years the courts have introduced a number of
significant reforms to the law of medical malpractice, including the
discovery rule, 9 national standards of care0 and enterprise liability. " The
16. For example,
the number of claims filed per physician is eight times higher in the
United States than in Canada; ... Canadian physicians are sued for
negligence about one-fifth as often as U.S. physicians .... [and] Canadian
physicians also pay about one-ninth the amount paid by their U.S.
counterparts for malpractice insurance.
Theresa M. Hottenroth, Lessons from Canada: A Prescription for Medical Liability
Reform, 13 Wis. INT'L L.J. 285, 292 (1994).
17. AMA/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project, Tort Reform Codification:
Model Medical Liability and Patient Protection Act, 1 CTS., HEALTH SC. & L. 87
(1990). See also Kirk B. Johnson, Carter G. Phillips, David Orentlicher, and
Martin S. Hatlie, A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical
Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365 (1989) and Antoinette D. Paglia,
Taking the Tort out of Court - Administrative Adjudication of Medical Liability
Claims: Is It the Next Step?, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 41 (1991).
18. The system is not without critics.
[T]he tort-based medical liability system in the U.S. does a poor job of
compensating injured parties, and its effectiveness at deterring negligent
practice is questionable. Yet the costs of the system are substantial, both
when measured in terms of direct premium costs and even more so when
the costs of defensive medicine and of reduced access to care are
considered.
Hottenroth, supra note 16, at 290.
19. In the past, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice typically
commenced to run when the treatment was rendered. See, e.g., Shearin v. Lloyd,
98 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. 1957). This foreclosed many worthy claims. For example, in
Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc, 491 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 1986), the patient received a
hip replacement in 1973, and the apparatus broke in 1981. The court held that the
cause of action accrued in 1973 and that the claim was barred by the statute of
[Vol. 19:1
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cumulative effect of these reforms has worked a sea change allowing
patients unparalleled opportunities to redress medical harm.
Insurers and the health care industry have made determined efforts to
limit injured patients' rights to recovery for medical malpractice as part of
the "tort reform" movement. Tort reform proposals include caps on
recovery for pain and suffering, medical screening panels, statutes of
limitations. To correct this inequity the courts and legislatures adopted the
"discovery rule," allowing the statute of limitations to commence running when
the patient discovers the fact that medical malpractice occurred. Some courts have
held that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff
discovers "that the injury was caused by the wrongful conduct of another." Mastro
v. Brodie, 682 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Colo. 1984).
20. Formerly, medical professionals were liable under "local" standards of
care; how would the reasonable and prudent physician in that community have
handled a case? Not only did this rule often lower the standard of care to which
professionals were held, it limited the pool of possible experts who could testify for
the plaintiff to physicians in the local community, which in many cases made it
impossible for the plaintiff to prove that malpractice occurred. The courts now
hold health care professionals and institutions to national standards of care,
imposing liability if they do not stay abreast of technological and professional
advancements. See, e.g., Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio 1976); Hall v.
Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985). Though Hall has been superceded by statute
for other reasons, Mississippi still follows the national standard of care.
21. Historically hospitals enjoyed sovereign or charitable immunity from suit.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 436 (1876).
Today, however, charitable immunity has been abolished. Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). Formerly, under the "independent contractor" doctrine
hospitals were not liable for the medical malpractice of the physicians who
rendered medical care at the hospital. Today, theories of liability such as apparent
agency, agency by estoppel and the "essential function" test have made great
inroads on the independent contractor doctrine. See Boyd v. Albert Einstein
Medical Center, 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa 1988) (finding "a question of material fact as to
whether the participating physicians were the ostensible agents of HMO."). In
addition, liability is increasingly being imputed to hospitals and managed care
organizations under theories of direct liability such as negligent credentialing and
negligent utilization review. As one author states:
At least twenty-two states have adopted some form of the hospital
corporate liability theory and provide some legal relief for the tort of
negligent credentialing. With the advent of managed care and the
emergence of new types of health care delivery systems, the theory of
corporate liability has expanded to include these new health care delivery
systems.
Carol P. Michel, Credentialing Liability in the Managed Care Arena, 35 TORT &
INS. L.J. 137 (1999).
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repose and stricter requirements for qualifying expert testimony.22 State
courts have often declared these proposed laws unconstitutional under
state constitutions for blocking patients' access to the courts.23 However, a
federal statute, ERISA,24 has been held to preempt patients' claims against
health insurers for denial of medical care.25
Genetic-based medicine will be subject to civil liability for medical
malpractice on the same basis as other forms of treatment. There will be
actions for failure to diagnose genetic conditions, particularly birth
defects.26  As in the case of Jesse Gelsinger, there will be actions
22. See, e.g., Ohio Amended Sub. H.B. 350, discussed and declared
unconstitutional in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715
N.E.2d 1062, 1102 (Ohio 1999).
23. One author notes:
State supreme courts have invalidated damage caps on the following four
grounds: (1) violation of the right to trial by jury enshrined in the state
constitution, (2) violation of the equal protection guarantee of the state
constitution, (3) violation of the due process clause of a state constitution,
and (4) violation of the right-to-a-remedy (open courts) provision of a
state constitution. David Fink, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, The
Remittitur Doctrine, and the Implications for Tort Reform, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 227,266 (1999).
In Ohio, the state supreme court also invoked provisions of the state
constitution giving the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules of
evidence and procedure, the separation of powers doctrine under the state
constitution, and the "one-issue rule" of the state constitution, in declaring the
state tort reform statute to be invalid. State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1102.
24. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2000).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). See generally Jeffrey E. Shuren, Legal
Accountability for Utilization Review in ERISA Health Plans, 77 N.C. L. REV. 731
(1999). Many scholars deplore ERISA preemption of utilization review claims; for
example, one scholar states: "Cost containment efforts must not be tolerated
when such attempts result in substandard medical care." Jose L. Gonzalez, A
Managed Care Organization's Medical Malpractice Liability for Denial of Care:
The Lost World, 35 Hous. L. REV. 715, 720 (1998). Congress is presently
considering legislation that would repeal ERISA preemption. See, e.g., The
Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 526 and S. 283, 107th Cong. (2001).
26. "Physicians have been successfully sued who failed to offer genetic testing
to couples who gave birth to a child with a genetic disorder, who misinterpreted
genetic test results, or who failed properly to inform couples about their risk of
having a child with a genetic disorder." Maxwell J. Mehiman, The Effect of
Genomics on Health Services Management. Ethical and Legal Perspectives, 17
FRONTIERS HEALTH SERV. MGMT. 28, 42-43, 2001 WL 18452203 (citations
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contending that the individual and institutional health care researchers did
not conform to ethical or medical standards in conducting clinical trials.
27
Genetic science may cause a relatively rare type of lawsuit to become
more common. Health care providers are typically not liable to non-
patients. The rare exception has been the Tarasoff-type liability, named
for a case where a psychotherapist failed to warn a person that his patient
intended to kill her. 8 Upon examining their patients, genetic health care
providers will acquire immense knowledge not only about their patients,
but also about their patients' relatives. This is knowledge that will often
mean the difference between life and death. Will the providers of genetic
services have a legal duty to warn these relatives of dangerous medical
conditions? Will non-patients be permitted to sue for failure to warn?
The trend of the case law is to allow suit by non-patients where physicians
failed to warn their own patients of the risks to others. 9
omitted). For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that when a child is
conceived following a failed sterilization procedure, the parents may recover
expenses incurred in connection with pregnancy and birth, but are not entitled to
the costs of raising the child, "when the child's birth defect was not reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant who negligently performed the sterilization
procedure." Simmerer v. Dabbas, 733 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 (Ohio 2000). Cf Smith v.
Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986) (allowing recovery). However, the great majority
of courts have denied recovery in "wrongful life" actions brought by a child whose
birth defects were not diagnosed. See Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio
2000).
27. The Gelsingers' lawsuit was settled out of court. Huntly Collins, U Penn
Scientists Discover Reason for Death of Gene-Therapy Teen, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETrE, January 26, 2001, at B8. Their attorney, Alan Milstein, has
subsequently brought suit against other medical research centers on behalf of
patients harmed during clinical trials; in describing a suit against the Hutchinson
Center Milstein stated, "The issue of whether or not the experiment here
conformed with these worldwide ethical standards is a perfect issue for a class
action." Duff Wilson and David Heath, Class-Action Suit Filed Against 'The
Hutch': Protocol 126 Broke Laws, Say Families of Cancer Patients, SEATTLE TIMES,
March 27, 2001, at Al. For a thorough discussion of the practical and legal
barriers to suing medical researchers, see James T. O'Reilly, Elders, Surgeons,
Regulators, Jurors: Are Medical Experimentation's Mistakes Too Easily Buried?, 31
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 317 (2000).
28. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
29. Must physicians contact patients' relatives to warn them of a genetic
danger, or is it sufficient to inform the patient of the risk to others? Compare Pate
v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1995) (physician had duty to warn patient of
risk to others), with Safer v. Pack, 677 A. 2d 1188 (N.J. 1996) (physician liable to
child of patient if child can prove that the physician's failure to warn her of the risk
of genetic disease violated the standard of care). See also Reisner v. Regents, 37
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The threat of a lawsuit for medical malpractice is the principal method
of regulating the quality of medical care and the law will have little
difficulty adapting existing theories of liability for genetic-based medicine.
In myriad cases the common law of medical malpractice has taken account
of technological change. It is now commonplace for medical professionals
and institutions to be subject to liability for failing to promptly adopt
advances in technology or medical technique.3 0  However, a serious
drawback to this method of regulating genetic technology is that it is
completely reactive, not proactive. It does not prevent harm; it only
deters it. No lawsuit can be brought until the damage has been done.
2. Products Liability
In addition to claims for medical malpractice, persons who are injured
by genetic technology may seek redress under the law of products liability,
which awards compensation for harm caused by defective products."
Physicians and pharmaceutical companies may assert three principal
defenses to products liability claims: a heightened standard that
discourages recovery for design defects, federal preemption and the
learned intermediary doctrine.3 2
Under the law of products liability, it is particularly difficult to prove
that a pharmaceutical product is defectively designed. In general, a
product is defectively designed if the product is "not reasonably safe. '33 In
contrast, pharmaceutical products are considered to have a design defect
only if the foreseeable risks of the drug were so great in relation to its
therapeutic benefits that no reasonable physician would ever prescribe it
"for any class of patients.
' '4
Cal Rptr.2d 518 (1995) (physician liable to patient's partner for failure to warn
patient of HIV infection).
30. For example, in Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, 579 A.2d 177,
179 (D.C. 1990), the court affirmed a verdict finding the hospital liable for failure
to provide its anesthesiologists with an end-tidal carbon dioxide monitor.
31. "One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to
persons or property caused by the defect." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PROD. LIAB. §1 (1997).
32. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
33. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1997).
34.
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or
medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of
[Vol. 19:1
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Federal preemption may also prevent recovery by injured patients, as
some courts have held that federal law preempts state law claims for
products liability for defective "medical devices."35 However, federal law
does not preempt claims for defective "drugs" or "biologic products., 36 It
may be difficult in some cases, particularly with combination products, to
determine whether the product is a drug, a biologic, or a device. 7
Another barrier to recovery is the "learned intermediary doctrine,"
which is the principle that a manufacturer or distributor of prescription
drugs need only provide warnings or instructions to the physician, not to
the patient.38 This principle has come under attack as pharmaceutical
31companies have begun direct advertising to consumers.
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the
drug or medical device for any class of patients.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(b)(3)(c) (1997).
35. The 1976 Medical Device Amendment (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act prohibits state law from establishing any requirement for medical
devices that is different from or in addition to the FDCA. 21 §360(k) (2000).
Some courts have interpreted the MDA as preempting state law claims for
products liability in cases where the medical device successfully passed FDA
testing for safety and effectiveness. See, e.g., Lake v. TPLC, 1 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.
Mass. 1998). For a discussion of the MDA, its history, and subsequent
interpretation see Juliann L. Safko, Massachusetts Sets Precedent for the First
Circuit: The Premarket Approval Process of the Medical Device Amendment
Preempts State Common Law Causes of Action, 34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 739 (2000).
36. Michael Baram, Ellen Flannery, Patricia Davis, and Gary Marchant,
Regulatory and Liability Considerations, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 5, 22 (2000).
37. Id. at 20-21.
38. The Restatement of Torts describes the learned intermediary doctrine as
follows:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings
regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to: (1) prescribing
and other health-care providers who are in a position to reduce the risks
of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or (2) the patient
when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that health-care
providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in
accordance with the instructions or warnings.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(d).
39. See Yonni D. Fushman, Perez v. Wyeth Labs, Inc.: Toward Creating a
Direct-to-Consumer Advertisement Exception to the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2000).
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3. Property, Contract, and Family Law
There are three types of human tissue that may be the subject of
biotechnology: somatic tissue such as stem cells," individual human genes
41
and early forms of human development including preembryos and
embryos.42 Property, contract and family law determine ownership rights
in these tissues. 3
The common law of property and contracts presently governs the
ownership of human tissue, cell lines and genetic information.' Medical
researchers and biotech firms can gain ownership of human tissue by
means of a contract, so long as there is adequate disclosure of both
medical and financial implications to patients.45  When researchers
removed a patient's spleen and took blood samples without informing the
patient that they were developing a valuable cell line from his T-
40. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
41. For a discussion of the patentability of human genes, see generally Mary
Breen Smith, An End to Gene Patents? The Human Genome Project Versus the
Patent and Trademark Office's 1999 Utility Guidelines, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 747
(2002).
42. See infra notes 45, 47-48 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
44. The leading case governing ownership rights in human tissue is Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Ca. 1990). In that case the
court ruled that ownership of the patient's spleen was governed by the law of
property, stating,
Since Moore clearly did not expect to retain possession of his cells
following their removal, to sue for their conversion he must have retained
an ownership interest in them. But there are several reasons to doubt that
he did retain any such interest. First, no reported judicial decision
supports Moore's claim, either directly or by close analogy. Second,
California statutory law drastically limits any continuing interest of a
patient in excised cells. Third, the subject matters of the Regent's
patient-the patented cell line and the products derived from it-cannot
be Moore's property.
Id. at 488-489 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 488-489. (holding that, "a physician who is seeking a patient's
consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to
obtain the patient's informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the
patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical
judgment." See also Joel N. Epross, In Vitro Fertilization: Perspectives on Current
Issues, 32 JURIMETRIcs 447, 459-461 (1992) (discussing the applicability of the law
of property and contracts to human embryos).
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lymphocytes, the Supreme Court of California ruled that the researchers
were liable to the patient.46
New reproductive technology enables persons to create children with
donated gametes and/or gestational surrogates. Efforts to plan
technologically assisted procreation involve the law of contracts, which has
threatened to supplant family law in determinations of parentage. 7 The
conflict between property, contract and family law has been the sharpest
when divorcing couples have fought over ownership of "frozen embryos.
4 8
These cases pale in comparison to battles between research institutions
and biotech firms over the building blocks and initial forms of potential
life.49
B. Specific Statutory Rights
The courts are not the only governmental body to recognize individual
rights; they are also created by legislatures.0 As with common law rights
and duties, legislatively created rights are designed to deter harmful
46. See Moore v. Regents, 793 P.2d at 480.
47. Three reported gestational surrogacy cases have addressed the question of
the identity of the mother. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Ca. 1993); Belsito v.
Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio 1994); and Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d
280 (1998). The California decisions gave primary effect to the intent of the
parties in enforcing the surrogacy agreement. See Robert M. Kort, Johnson v.
Calvert, California Supreme Court Enforces Surrogacy Contract, 26 ARIZ ST. L. J.
243 (1994). In contrast, the Ohio court emphasized the primacy of the genetic link
in the absence of waiver or consent. See Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative
Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L.
REV. 127, 137-38 (2000). Professor Malina Coleman has suggested that the law of
contracts should not be applied rigidly to surrogacy agreements; instead, "there
must be procedures in place which guarantee to the greatest extent possible that
the decision to contribute one's reproductive function was freely made after
careful deliberation on the part of all the individuals involved." Malina Coleman,
Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human
Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 529 (1996).
48. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v. Kass, 696
N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v.M.B.,
751 A.2d 613 (N.J. 2000). See generally Susan B. Apel, Disposition of Frozen
Embryos: Are Contracts the Solution?, 27 VT. B. J. 29 (March, 2001).
49. See Faith S. Fillman, Comment: Doctrine of Equivalents: Is Festo the Right
Decision for the Biomedical Industry?, 33 St. Mary's L.J. 493, 510-14 (2002)
(detailing the critical importance of the "doctrine of equivalents" to protecting
patents against competing companies in the field of biotechnology).
50. Statutes may either repeal or supplement the common law. Federal
statutes may expressly or implicitly preempt conflicting provisions of state law.
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conduct." In general, the government does not directly enforce these laws.
Instead, the vast majority of legislatively created rights are enforced by
individuals by means of civil lawsuits. It is as if the legislature makes every
citizen a "private attorney general" empowered to enforce the law.52 In
many cases, this is a more effective method of regulation than direct action
by administrative agencies."
The preeminent statute creating rights in this field is the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA).' This law prohibits all discrimination in
employment and in places of public accommodation against individuals
who have an actual disability, or because the individual is regarded as
having a disability.55 Proponents of the ADA assumed that it would
protect employees from genetic discrimination.56
Initially, there was reason for hope. In 1995, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued official guidelines prohibiting
genetic discrimination against employees57 and in 2000, President Clinton
51. For example, the Americans with Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2000), was intended to deter discrimination against persons on the basis of
disability.
52. For example, the Supreme Court recently stated: "The object of civil
RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors,
'private attorneys general,' dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity." Rotella
v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000).
53. For example, the "citizens' suit" provision of the Endangered Species Act
has been utilized in dozens of cases to protect over 400 species of plants and
animals. Douglas Jehl, Moratorium Asked on Suits That Seek to Protect Species,
N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2001, at Al. Representative George Miller of California
compared the efficacy of citizen suits to agency action: "If you didn't have the
citizens' suits, you'd basically have the power brokers determining if you were
going to save the salmon or the spotted owl, and that just doesn't make sense." Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). "The term 'disability' means, with respect to
an individual - (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2) (2000).
56. See Joseph S. Alper et. al., EEOC Compliance Manual for the ADA and
Genetic Discrimination, 61 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 95 (1996) (citing
Representatives Owens, Edwards and Waxman).
57. 2 U.S. EEOC Compl. Man., Order 915.002, at 902-45 (1995). However, the
Supreme Court has held that the EEOC does not have delegated authority to
interpret the term "disability." Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 479
(1999). In 2001 the EEOC forced the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad to
cease genetic testing of employees who had developed carpal tunnel syndrome.
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issued an Executive Order forbidding the federal government from
discriminating on the basis of genetic makeup."' Unfortunately, the
United States Supreme Court, in a trio of decisions handed down in 1999,
tore the heart out of the ADA. In Sutton v. United Air Lines59 and its
companion cases,60 the Court held that employers could discriminate
against people with imperfect vision or high blood pressure, even though
these conditions were medically corrected. The court reasoned that this
was not discrimination on the basis of disability because the employers did
not regard the plaintiffs as completely disabled from working; the
employers simply did not regard the plaintiffs as "ideally suited" for
particular jobs, such as a global airline pilot.6' The Court's crabbed
interpretation of the ADA severely reduces the likelihood that the act will
61protect persons with asymptomatic genetic disabilities.
The lesson of Sutton is that federal laws protecting people from genetic
discrimination will have to be very carefully drafted to prevent the courts
from giving them a blinkered and narrow interpretation. Several
competing genetic nondiscrimination bills have been introduced in
Congress. 6 Even though thirty-five states outlaw genetic discrimination in
Rip Watson, Burlington Northern Settles Suit Over Genetic Tests, L.A. TIMES,
April 11, 2001, at C3.
58. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 10, 2000).
59. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
60. Albertson's v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1999); Murphy v. UPS,
Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 525 (1999).
61. The Court stated:
[An employer is free to decide that physical characteristics or medical
conditions that do not rise to the level of an impairment - such as one's
height, build, or singing voice - are preferable to others, just as it is free to
decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments
make individuals less than ideally suited for a job.
527 U.S. at 490-91 (emphasis in original).
62. As one legal scholar noted: "Although none of these decisions concerned
the issue of asymptomatic genetic disabilities, these cases restrict the definition of
who is a qualified individual with a disability, and thus, they may ultimately have
an impact on the issue." Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes?
Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 245
(2000). See also Brian M. Holt, Genetically Defective: The Judicial Interpretation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act Fails to Protect Against Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 457 (2002).
63. See Judy Holland, Senators Try to Halt Genetic Tests for Jobs, Insurance,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 1, 2002, at Al (describing competing privacy
and nondiscrimination bills introduced by Senator Tom Daschle and Senator
Olympia Snowe). See, e.g., S. 1995, 107th Cong. (2002) (prohibiting discrimination
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health insurance coverage and twenty-three states ban the use of genetic
information in employment, 6' "under the current state and federal
statutory schemes there are serious gaps in protection., 65 Lori Andrews
suggests that, to be effective, such laws should require a patient's informed
consent before testing, forbid classification of genetic disorders as
"preexisting conditions" that may be used to deny insurance coverage and
specifically prohibit employment discrimination based on genetic testing
or family history.66
C. Constitutional Rights and Duties
Federal constitutional rights will play a major role in shaping the law
that will govern the use of genetic technology. The Constitution
articulates our fundamental rights in broad terms. These provisions67
should be interpreted to guarantee the autonomy of parents and patients
to make personal choices in reproduction and health; preserve the dignity
of the human race by prohibiting ownership and exploitation of humans;
protect health care providers and the biotechnology industry from undue
restrictions on scientific inquiry and commercial speech; and defend the
genetic autonomy of children.
on the basis of genetic information with respect to health insurance and
employment).
64. See Bonnie Erbe, Genetic's Gain is Privacy's Loss, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
SENTINAL, February 14, 2001, at 13A.
65. Tara L. Rachinshy, Genetic Testing: Toward a Comprehensive Policy to
Prevent Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT
L. 575, 578 (2000). See generally Jared A. Feldman & Richard J. Katz, Genetic
Testing and Discrimination in Employment: Recommending a Uniform Statutory
Approach, 19 HOF. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389 (2002).
66. See ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 138-40; see also Lori B. Andrews, A
Conceptual Framework for Genetic Policy: Comparing the Medical, Public Health,
and Fundamental Rights Models, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 221, 258-66 (2001).
67. Many of our fundamental rights are derived from broad language set forth
in the First Amendment, ("Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom
of speech .... " U.S. CONST amend. I.) and the Fourteenth Amendment. ("No
state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1.).
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1. Procreation
It is well established in the United States that people have procreative
rights. Skinner v. Oklahoma,6' Griswold v. Connecticut69 and Roe v. Wade0
stand for the proposition that people have the right to decide for
themselves whether or not to have children. In order to regulate in this
field, the government must have a "compelling governmental interest,"7
that is, a goal that outweighs and subordinates the interest of the
individual in becoming or not becoming a parent." Many legal scholars
believe that this right to procreation extends to infertile couples the
opportunity to take advantage of new reproductive techniques such as in
vitro fertilization and gamete transfers.73 But how far will this right
extend? Will the right include cloning?74
Furthermore, although health care itself has not been recognized as a
fundamental right under the Constitution of the United States,75 the courts
68. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal
Sterilization Act).
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a Connecticut law prohibiting any person
from using a contraceptive drug or device).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a Texas law that outlawed abortion at all
stages of pregnancy).
71. For example, in Roe, the Court stated: "Where certain 'fundamental rights'
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be
justified only by a 'compelling state interest' and that legislative enactments must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake . Id. at
155.
72. Concurring in Griswold, Justice Goldberg equated a "compelling"
governmental interest with a "subordinating" one: "Surely the Government,
absent a showing of a compelling subordinating state interest, could not decree
that all husbands and wives must be sterilized after two children have been born to
them." 381 U.S. at 496-97 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
73. See Lori B. Andrews and Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive
Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 45 (2000).
74. See id. at 46; see generally Cass R. Sustein, Is There a Constitutional Right
to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987 (2002).
75. "[Tjhe Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill." Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding no constitutional
right to housing), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (finding no
constitutional right to welfare benefits). In DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Supreme Court gave clear
expression to the "no affirmative duty doctrine," the principle that the purpose of
the Constitution "was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the
State protected them from each other." Id. at 196. However, President Franklin
Roosevelt considered "adequate medical care" to be encompassed within the
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have recognized that parents have the constitutional right to make
decisions for their dependent children]6 This includes the right to make
health care decisions for a child.77 This would certainly include the right
to obtain somatic cell gene therapy for a child to combat disease. 8
However, the parental right of control is not absolute.79 Will this right of
parental control, coupled with their right of procreation, allow parents to
arrange for the genetic engineering of gametes and embryos?'
concept "Freedom from Want," and a fit subject for "a second bill of rights."
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11,
1944), reprinted in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32, 41
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1969). Furthermore, medical care is expressly listed as a
"human right" under Art. 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One
scholar has argued that the framers of the Constitution would have embraced a
right to medical care. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution:
Public Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 267 (1992).
76. Parental rights were first recognized by the Supreme Court in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In that case the Court held that parents had the
right to have their children learn the German language, specifically stating that the
word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed "the right to bring up
children." Id. at 399.
77. See Burge v. City and County of San Francisco, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1953)
(noting that medical decisionmaking for the child is within the realm of authority
conferred upon a parent in the rearing of children).
78. However, ethicists have distinguished genetic treatment from genetic
enhancement. "In the present state of knowledge any attempt by gene
modification to change human traits not associated with disease would not be
acceptable." CLOTHIER COMMITITEE, REPORT OF THE COMMITITEE ON THE ETHICS
OF GENE THERAPY 17 (1992).
79. For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Supreme
Court held that a parent did not have a constitutional right to allow a child to work
in violation of child labor laws. "Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves. But it does not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves." Id. at 170. See Adam
Lamparello, Taking God Out of the Hospital: Requiring Parents to Seek Medical
Care for Their Children Regardless of Their Religious Belief, 6 TEX. F. Civ. LIB. &
Civ. RTS. 47, 48 (2001) (arguing that parents do not have the constitutional right to
deny their children medical care for religious reasons).
80. See generally Megan Anne Jellinek, Disease Prevention and the Genetic
Revolution: Defining a Parental Right to Protect the Bodily Integrity of Future
Children, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 369 (2000); and Maxwell J. Mehlman, How
Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 (1999).
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Lawsuits presenting these claims may be brought by health care
providers or even biotechnology companies. The plaintiffs in Griswold v.
Connecticut were the Executive Director and Medical Director of Planned
Parenthood in that state.8' The Supreme Court expressly held that they
had standing to challenge the state statute that outlawed the use of birth
control devices.82
2. Slavery
So far, this article has considered and explored the constitutional
limitations on government regulation of genetic technology. However,
does the Constitution prevent individuals or private corporations from
engaging in certain types of genetic experimentation? Generally, the
Constitution does not govern the actions of individuals. However, there is
one provision of the United States Constitution that limits the kinds of
relationships that persons may establish with each other. Section one of
the Thirteenth Amendment abolishes slavery.83 Under that clause, no
person in the United States may own or enslave another." Furthermore,
under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment,85 the Supreme Court
has ruled that Congress has the power to abolish the "badges" and
incidents of slavery. '
81. 381 U.S. at 480.
82. Id. at 481.
83. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII, § 1.
84. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). The Supreme Court held that
"The [13th] [A]mendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or
upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude
shall not exist in any part of the United States." Id.
85. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
86. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S at 21 (1983) (holding that Congress not only has
the power to prohibit slavery, but also, "Congress has a right to enact all necessary
and proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges
and incidents..."). Accordingly, Congress is authorized to enact laws restricting
slavery itself, but also any activity that constitutes a "badge" or "incident" of
slavery.
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In 1987, the United States Patent Office issued a policy statement
stating that the Constitution outlawed patents on humans. In an attempt
to test this ruling, the Foundation on Economic Trends applied for a
patent on a half-human, half-animal chimera.' The Patent Office denied
this application on the ground that the creation of half-human chimeras
was contrary to public policy and morality and therefore not "useful"
within the meaning of the Patent Act. 9
It is clear that any attempt to create human beings like the Epsilons of
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World who were genetically engineered to
perform menial tasks' would violate the Thirteenth Amendment. It is
equally apparent that it would violate the fundamental rule of morality,
Emmanuel Kant's categorical imperative, that no person may be treated
solely as a means to other people's ends.91
87. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Policy Statement on
Patentability of Animals, 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 24 (April 7, 1987),
reprinted in DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, App. 24-2 (1998).
88. See Rick Weiss, U.S. Ruling Aids Opponents of Patents for Life Forms,
WASH. POST, June 17, 1999, at A2.
89. "[T]he PTO has wisely backed away from its reliance on the Thirteenth
Amendment, which was a shaky legal basis for the denial of patents for human-
based inventions." James P. Daniel, Of Mice and 'Manimal': The Patent &
Trademark Office's Latest Stance Against Patent Protection for Human-Based
Inventions, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 118 (1999). The Patent Act provides that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore . 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The reliance
of the Patent Office on "public policy" and "morality" to interpret the usefulness
requirement of the Patent Law reflects the "Story view of utility, " a controversial
reading of the law discussed in Daniel, supra at 119-124.
90. "We decant our babies as socialized human beings, as Alphas or Epsilons,
as future sewer workers or future [world controllers]." ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE
NEW WORLD 13 (1998). One could argue that the Alphas were just as enslaved,
just as deprived of individuality, as the Epsilons.
91. This is the "Formula of the End Itself" version of the categorical
imperative: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at
the same time as an end." THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
Categorical Imperative, at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/c/catimper (last visited
Oct. 14, 2002).
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3. The Right to Scientific Inquiry
There is little doubt that there exists a constitutional right to engage in
scientific inquiry. In Epperson v. Arkansas,' the Supreme Court struck
down an Arkansas law that prohibited the teaching of evolution in the
public schools, acknowledging "the fundamental values of freedom of
speech and inquiry and of belief."93 The Court has noted that human
progress depends upon freedom of inquiry: "Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die.
,94
The more difficult question is: may the government limit scientists'
ability to conduct experiments on living matter? 95 It was settled in Roe v.
Wade that an embryo, even a third-trimester fetus, has no constitutional
rights because the fetus is not a person within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.96 Accordingly, the only rights that a fetus or
embryo possesses are those conferred upon it by state or federal statutes.97
In Roe, the Supreme Court held that a woman may abort a fetus prior to
viability.9 However, in that case the court was balancing the state's
interest in protecting fetal life against a woman's procreative rights and
her right to bodily integrity, and the Court found that prior to viability the
92. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
93. Id. at 104.
94. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1954). In an obscenity case,
the Court observed: "The protection given speech and press was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
95. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges
to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647, 661-664 (1998); E.
Donald Shapiro, Jennifer Long, and Rebecca Gideon, To Clone or Not to Clone, 4
NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 34 (2000-2001).
96. "[T]he word 'person', as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
include the unborn." Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
97. For example, the current Presidential administration has chosen to issue
regulations that recognize fetuses as children under federal law. See Vicki
Kemper, White House Issues Regulation That Defines Fetuses as Children, L.A.
TIMES, September 28, 2002, page A23 ("The Bush administration ... issued a final
regulation defining human fetuses and embryos as children, saying it would allow
states to offer prenatal health care to greater numbers of poor women.").
98. "For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in
the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother .... Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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state's interest in protecting fetal life was not compelling enough to
outweigh the woman's fundamental rights.9
What if there were no procreative rights or rights to bodily integrity to
weigh in the balance? What if the only right interposed against the state's
interest in protecting embryonic or fetal life was the First Amendment
right to scientific inquiry? The courts might well uphold a governmental
ban on fetal or embryonic experimentation."
4. Commercial Speech
To what extent is the biotechnology industry free to advertise advances
in genetics and offer these services to the public? Commercial speech
enjoys protection under the First Amendment.'1 The Supreme Court has
held that entities engaging in constitutionally protected activity must be
allowed to advertise.'9 Furthermore, all entities engaged in lawful
activities must be allowed to engage in truthful, non-misleading
advertising unless the government can demonstrate that a ban or limit on
advertising directly serves a substantial governmental interest. °3 To the
extent that the uses of genetic technology are lawful, speech advertising
these services will be protected." '
99. The Court stated: "With respect to the state's important and legitimate
interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability." Id. at 163.
100. A federal district court upheld a Louisiana statute that banned
experimentation on embryos. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 220-21
(E.D. La. 1980).
101. The first Supreme Court decision holding that the First Amendment
applies to commercial speech was Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
102. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977) (striking
down ban on contraceptive advertising); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825
(1975) (striking down ban on abortion advertising).
103. The leading case establishing the standard of review for laws regulating
commercial speech is Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of New
York, 447 U.S. 557,571-72 (1980).
104. The biotechnology industry has already invoked this principle. In
International Dairy Foods v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2nd Cir. 1996), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down a Vermont labeling
law that required retailers to provide notification to consumers if milk they sold
had been derived from cows treated with recombinant bovine somatotropin
(rBST). The Court held that Vermont's interest was not substantial enough to
justify the law: "[C]onsumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state interest to
sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement." Id. at 74.
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5. The Rights of Children
The "undiscovered country" in the field of Constitutional Law is
the articulation of the fundamental rights of children. The history of our
Constitution is a story of expanding human rights, and a growing
understanding and appreciation of human potential. Basic human rights
have been extended to African-Americans 5 and other minority groups."
In addition, women have earned equal rights under the Constitution."
Gays and lesbians are in the process of winning equal recognition as
well.'0 6
As yet, however, the rights of children are still circumscribed by the
same "paternalism" that once characterized the treatment of slaves and
married women. The notion of children as independent legal entities is as
foreign to us as racial and gender equality was to our ancestors who
drafted the Constitution. But the organic growth of our Constitution,
along with the progress of our nation in the recognition of human rights,
will one day accord substantial protection to children.
This has special importance in the field of genetics. May we screen
embryos for implantation for the purpose of creating a tissue match? °"
105. The Constitutional struggle for racial equality has raged for generations,
beginning with the Civil War Amendments, and marked by the eventual abolition
of official segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
106. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (citizens and non-
citizens of Chinese descent protected by the Equal Protection Clause); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (children of undocumented aliens are protected by
Equal Protection Clause).
107. The seminal gender discrimination case was decided a mere thirty years
ago. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
108. Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating Colorado
law that prohibited municipalities from adopting gay rights legislation) with
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-99 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy
statute).
109. As of 1994, over forty children had been conceived for the specific purpose
of donating bone marrow to a sibling. Vicki G. Norton, Unnatural Selection:
Nontherapeutic Preimplantation Genetic Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1581, 1598 (1994).
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May we create a child who has no legal parents?"' May a child's genetic
makeup be altered prior to birth, obviously without its consent?"'
The responsibility for regulating genetic technology by developing the
common law, applying statutes creating individual rights and interpreting
the Constitution will belong to the courts. However, the enforcement of
these rights lies wholly in the hands of individuals. This model of
regulation reflects the nineteenth century ideal of the state as a neutral
arbiter; a government that merely adjudicates disputes between competing
social interests."' This was the model of "classical legal thought" that
dominated American law in the 19th and early 20th Centuries."3 Just as
economic depression and world war called forth a new, more active
conception of the state,"' the challenges of genetic technology will
necessitate greater government oversight. In the following section, this
article will describe scientific regulation by administrative agencies.
II. SCIENTIFIC REGULATION
Administrative agencies are creatures of statute. They are not
established by the Constitution,"5 nor can they call themselves into
110. A California trial court concluded that a child created with donated
gametes and gestated by a surrogate "had no legal parents." Buzzanca, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 282. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the "intended
parents" were the lawful parents. Id.
111. "Arguments against such research cite the fact that genetic experiments
inevitably involve human embryos and, thus, are performed without the consent of
the experimental subject." John R. Harding, Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics
and the New Eugenics, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 471, 486-87 (1991).
112. MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1950 19 (1994).
113. Id. at 20, 33. "From the beginning of the twentieth century, Classical Legal
Thought found itself confronted by an increasingly powerful critique of its basic
premises. In one legal field after another, Progressive thinkers challenged both the
political and moral assumptions of the old order and the structures of legal
doctrine and legal reasoning that were designed to represent those assumptions as
neutral, natural, and necessary." Id. at 169.
114. See generally id. at 213-246 (Chapter 8, Legal Realism, The Administrative
State, and the Rule of Law), and 247-72 (Chapter 9, Post War Legal Thought).
115. The Founders did, however, anticipate the creation of administrative
agencies. The Constitution provides that the President "may require the Opinion,
in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 1, and that "Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
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creation. ' 16 The statutes that create and empower administrative agencies
- statutes called "enabling acts" - are fundamentally different from
statutes that create individual rights and duties. Aggrieved citizens
enforce statutes that grant individual rights." 7  In contrast, the agencies
themselves enforce the statutes that create them."" Statutes granting
individual rights are interpreted in the first instance by the courts." 9 Those
statutes that create and empower administrative agencies are primarily
interpreted by the agencies themselves.' 20  To be effective, statutes
protecting individual rights must be clear and unambiguous, while
enabling acts should use the broadest possible language in granting
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies.1
2
1
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
116. "[U]nder our constitutional system, agencies are creatures of the
legislature. They do not spring up on their own, and they cannot be created by
courts. Agencies function only insofar as a legislature has given them the authority
to function." WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 4 (3d
ed.1997).
117. See, e.g., the Federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which
provided in relevant part:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a
crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the
right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party
injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court
may deem appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2000).
This provision of the VAWA was declared unconstitutional in United States v.
Morrison, 120 U.S. 598 (2000), on the ground that Congress lacked power under
the commerce clause of Article I and the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact the statute.
118. See Fox, supra note 116, at 145-46 (noting that in the context of agency
rulemaking, "the Supreme Court has admonished federal courts to defer to an
agency's technical judgments.").
119. In the United States, this principle of judicial interpretation of the law may
be traced to the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), where the
Court stated: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." Id. at 177.
120. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (describing the broad
discretion agencies may exercise in interpreting enabling acts under the Chevron
doctrine).
121. For example, if the language of the ADA had specifically provided that the
term "disability" includes corrected disabilities, the claimants in Sutton would have
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Administrative agencies are collectively a fourth branch of government.
Each agency is designed to carry out a specific function, such as to protect
the environment, fund the arts or oversee the military. Each of the
traditional three branches of government has some power to oversee this
fourth branch. 22 The President appoints agency heads with the consent of
the Senate.'2 He may remove the heads of executive branch agencies at
will,"' and the heads of the independent agencies for cause." Congress
establishes an agency by enacting the enabling act, which defines the
agency's mission and the scope of its powers.126 Congress also allocates the
funds for agencies and exercises other oversight functions. 2 7 The courts
review the actions of administrative agencies to ensure that their decisions
are consistent with their enabling acts, the Administrative Procedure Act'2
and the Constitution.
Since the 1930s the United States has relied upon administrative
agencies to regulate American industry, but the administrative model
prevailed; in the alternative, if the Supreme Court had deferred to the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADA providing that disabilities included corrected
disabilities, the claimants would have prevailed. See Rebecca Hanner White,
Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 532, 559-562 (2000).
However, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADA was entitled to deference: "Although the parties
dispute the persuasive force of these interpretive guidelines, we have no need in
this case to decide what deference is due." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480. As one author
noted: "The EEOC's lack of authority to promulgate substantive regulations under
Title VII, the statute with which the agency has been most closely identified, has
fostered a perception that the EEOC is a weak agency." White, supra at 549.
122. See Fox, supra note 116, at 21 (summarizing the ways in which the three
branches of the federal government exercise control over federal administrative
agencies).
123. "[The President] shall ... nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United States ......
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
124. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
125. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
126. "This principle - that the legislature creates agencies and sets limits on
their authority - should be regarded as cardinal rule number one of administrative
law." Fox, supra note 116, at 5.
127. See Fox, supra note 116, at 39-41 ("Congress polices day-to-day agency
action through what is known as the oversight process....There are many other
examples of congressional controls. The power to set an agency's budget may be
as important as all the other controls combined.").
128. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59
(2000).
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followed in the United States has several inherent biases against
regulation. First and foremost, agencies have the burden of establishing
grounds for regulation.'29 The agency must support any proposed ruling for
regulation with evidence in the record, it must explain its proposal in detail
and it must allow for comments by interested parties.3 Substantive rules
take years to adopt and they may also face years of court battles. 3 ' Above
all, the agency must demonstrate that its decisions are grounded in
science.' If an agency cannot demonstrate an adequate scientific basis for
a decision, the courts will strike it down.'33
Furthermore, the decisions of federal agencies, though they carry the
force of law, are always subject to being overturned when a new
129. The APA provides: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, the
proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
For example, in the Benzene case, Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, stated:
"As we read the statute, the burden was on the Agency to show, on the basis of
substantial evidence, that it is at least more likely than not that long-term exposure
to 10 ppm of benzene presents a significant risk of material health impairment."
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607,653 (1980).
130. The APA reads: "After notice required by this section, the agency shall
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for
oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their
basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000). This rule making procedure has
been criticized as overly cumbersome: "Our system of legality and administrative
law requires building a huge 'record' that will withstand judicial review as a
precondition to government regulation." E. Donald Elliott, Environmental
Markets and Beyond: Three Modest Proposals for the Future of Environment Law,
29 CAP. U.L. REV. 245, 253 (2001).
131. The exhausting battle over automobile airbags is instructive. "The
mandatory passive restraint controversy began with the passage of the Safety Act
and has since raged for over thirty years, outlasting seven presidents, eight heads
of the Department of Transportation, and more than eight Directors of the
NHTSA." John F. McCauley, Cipollone & Myrick: Deflating the Airbag
Preemption Defense, 30 IND. L. REV. 827, 832 (1997).
132. For example, the Clean Air Act requires that air quality criteria "shall
accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge," 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(C)(2)
(2000), and the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secretary of
Labor to take into consideration "the latest available scientific data in the field."
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
133. For an article arguing that courts should exercise tighter control over
agencies' use of science, see D. Hiep Truong, Daubert and Judicial Review: How
Does an Administrative Agency Distinguish Valid Science from Junk Science?, 33
AKRON L. REV. 365 (2000).
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Presidential Administration assumes office. Enabling acts are terribly
broad, generally empowering agencies to regulate in the name of the
"public interest', 34 or to " to protect the public health."'35  Under the
Chevron doctrine, agencies have discretion when interpreting their own
enabling acts. 36 Agency heads accomplish this by issuing regulations that
have the force of law.'37 The President has the power to remove the heads
of executive branch agencies at will, and a new President invariably does
so. As a result, new administrations frequently interpret the law in a
manner that is diametrically opposed to the interpretations given by the
former administration. For example, administrative agencies under the
Clinton administration took steps to reduce carbon dioxide emissions into
the atmosphere and the level of arsenic in the water, to fund international
agencies that offer abortion counseling and to institute ergonomic
regulations in the workplace, but upon taking office the Bush
administration immediately reversed course on these and a number of
other positions.
Thus, substantive administrative law may be considered primarily a
matter of decree by the executive branch. These decrees are always
subject to being reversed when the Presidency changes hands. All in all,
the scientific administrative model has a number of weaknesses that allow
134. For example, the Supreme Court upheld the delegation of power in the
Communications Act of 1934 that authorized the FCC to regulate broadcast
licensing in the "public interest." National Broadcasting Company v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-27 (1943).
135. The Supreme Court recently upheld the key provision of the Clean Air Act
that confers power upon the EPA to set ambient air quality standards that "are
requisite to protect the public health." Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531
U.S. 457 (2001) (upholding 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000)).
136. In Chevron the Supreme Court established the rule that agencies have
presumptive authority to interpret their enabling acts, stating: "[I]f the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843 (1984).
137. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 572, 665-66 (1984) (noting that
even President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291 requiring OMB supervision of
impact-analysis process "recognizes (as it must) that the authority to issue the rules
subject to the impact analysis process remained in the agency head, subject to
whatever political discipline the President might bring to bear.") (footnotes
omitted).
138. See Larry Eichel, It Makes a Difference: Close Elections Have Real
Consequences, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, April 1, 2001, at 02J.
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American industry to escape effective regulation. Agencies are slow to
act, and even when they do, their decisions may be reversed by the courts
or by a succeeding Presidential administration.
During the Reagan administration, the executive branch made three
fateful decisions that weakened administrative regulation of genetic
technology. First, the administration decided not to consolidate regulation
of the biotechnology industry in a single agency, but to allocate oversight
responsibilities among existing agencies under the umbrella of a
"Coordinated Framework."'39 Despite its name, the regulatory framework
has often lacked coordination.'4 Second, the administration decided not
to seek specific statutory authority to regulate the novel aspects of
biotechnology, but decided instead to attempt regulation under existing
statutes.'' This has forced agencies to be creative in their interpretation of
the law in order to exercise jurisdiction over genetic engineering. As
noted above, the Patent Office stated that a half-human creation would
not be a "useful" invention under the Patent Act.'4 2 In another example of
creative statutory interpretation, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has considered genes that are inserted into plants to confer
resistance to insects or viruses to be "pesticides" or "pesticide
chemicals" 4 13 under the Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,' 44 and
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).' 45 Third, at least in regard to
agricultural uses of genetic technology, the government decided not to
treat the process of genetic engineering in agriculture as inherently
dangerous, but that only the products of genetic engineering would be
139. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302 (June 26, 1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework].
140. Referring to the FDA and NIH oversight of human gene therapy, one
commentator notes: "There is significant overlap in the regulatory duties of both
agencies, resulting in a confusing duplication of reporting requirements for
researchers." Cregan, supra note 1, at 263.
141. "Upon examination of the existing laws available for the regulation of
products developed by traditional genetic manipulation techniques, the working
group concluded that, for the most part, these laws as currently implemented
would address regulatory needs adequately." Coordinated Framework, supra note
139, at 23,303.
142. See Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
143. See Karen A. Goldman, Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods: Legal and
Scientific Issues, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV. 717, 748-51 (2000).
144. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (2000) (defining "pesticide").
145. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(q) (2000) (defining "pesticide").
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tested for safety.4 6 Thus, the government regards a genetically engineered
tomato as still a tomato."7
Under this lax administrative regime, the agricultural biotech industry
has flourished, largely without public knowledge or debate. Twenty-four
percent of the corn grown in the United States last year was genetically
engineered, along with sixty-three percent of the soybeans and sixty-four
percent of the cotton.'4 The vast majority of consumers are unaware that
over sixty percent of the processed food that is consumed contains
genetically engineered products.49
At present, the FDA and National Institutes of Health (NIH)
administer regulatory control of genetic technology as applied to human
beings, but the jurisdiction of these agencies is limited. The NIH
guidelines are binding only upon recipients of federal funds, but have no
legal effect on other individuals or institutions."0 The FDCA gives the
FDA authority to "protect the public health by ensuring that human and
veterinary drugs are safe and effective,' 5. and the FDA has defined gene
146. "The application of traditional genetic modification techniques is relied
upon broadly for enhanced characteristics of food (e.g., hybrid corn, selective
breeding), manufactured food (e.g., bread, cheese, yogurt), waste disposal (e.g.,
bacterial sewage treatment), medicine (e.g., vaccines, hormones), pesticides (e.g.,
Bacillus thuringiensis) and other uses. Federal agencies implement an array of
laws which seek to ensure the safety of these products." Coordinated Framework,
supra note 139, at 23, 302.
147. "FDA believes that the new techniques [of genetic engineering] are
extensions at the molecular level of traditional methods and will be used to achieve
the same goals as pursued with traditional plant breeding. The agency is not aware
of any information showing that foods derived by these new methods differ from
other foods in any meaningful or uniform war, or that, as a class, foods developed
by the new techniques present any different or greater safety concern than foods
developed by traditional plant breeding." Statement of Policy: Foods Derived
from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22984, 22991 (May 29, 1992).
148. See Philip Brasher, Farmers to Plant More Biotech Soybeans, THE DES
MOINES REGISTER, March 31, 2001,at 6D.
149. The Grocery Manufacturers of America estimate that sixty to seventy
percent of processed food contains genetically modified corn or soy. Philip
Brasher, Most Consumers Unaware of Biotech Foods, COLUMBIAN, Mar. 27, 2001,
at El.
150. "The RAC [of NIH] has only ever had authority over federally-funded
projects and institutions." Rainsbury, supra note 3, at 597.
151. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B) (2000). The term "drug" is defined at 21 U.S.C. §
321(g) (2000).
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therapy as a "biologic product"' 5 2 and cloning as a "biologic product" or a
"drug"'53 within the meaning of the FDCA. However, before the agency
can regulate genetic engineering, it must be found that Congress intended
to include genetic engineering within the meaning of the FDCA. In a
recent decision that, by analogy, might threaten administrative control of
genetic engineering, the Supreme Court held that the FDA had no
authority to regulate nicotine in cigarettes even though nicotine is without
question a powerfully addictive drug, because the Court found that
Congress did not intend to give that power to the FDA.'
Many scholars were initially skeptical of the federal government's
"coordinated framework" for regulating biotechnology.' Today, attorney
Joseph Rainsbury characterizes federal oversight of human gene therapy
trials as "a regulatory success story,' 56 in that NIH review of gene therapy
protocols has been "measured, informed, and, most importantly,
152. "Nucleic acids or viruses used for human gene therapy will be subject to
the same requirements as other biological drugs." 51 Fed. Reg. 23,309 (June 26,
1986). As one commentator has noted, "Human gene therapy products defy easy
classification under the existing regulatory schemata of drugs, devices, or
biologics." Rainsbury, supra note 3, at 589.
153. The FDA asserts that it has authority to regulate human cloning under the
Health Service Act and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. It asserts that human
cloning may be considered either a "biologic product" or a "drug," and that
therefore scientists must request permission from the FDA before undertaking
cloning research. However, some lawmakers have expressed concern that the
courts would not recognize the FDA's authority to regulate cloning. Anthony
Shadid, Debate Flares Over Cloning of Humans - Complex Questions Arise on
Regulation Amid Announcements of Planned Efforts, THE BOSTON GLOBE, April
4, 2001, at D4. See also Baram, supra note 1, at 259.
154. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).
The Court stated:
In this case, we believe that Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from
asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. Such authority is
inconsistent with the intent that Congress has expressed in the FDCA's
overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific legislation that it
has enacted subsequent to the FDCA. In light of this clear intent, the
FDA's assertion of jurisdiction is impermissible.
155. John B. Attanasio, Review Essay, The Genetic Revolution: What Lawyers
Don't Know, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 662, 715-16 (1988). A typical criticism was that
"an essential component of any oversight scheme must be greater centralization.
The sheer mass of evolving genetic enterprise suggests that the government
concentrate its efforts in a single agency. The gaps and incoherence of the current
ad hoc endeavors render them inadequate to address the problems at hand." Id.
156. Rainsbury, supra note 3, at 600.
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transparent. 1 57 He notes, however, that as private corporations replace
universities as centers of research, the open and public nature of NIH
review will give way to FDA procedures that protect the confidentiality of
proprietary information."' In addition, as the focus of genetic research
turns from somatic cell therapy to more controversial procedures such as
human cloning, embryo research or germ line therapy, regulatory agencies
will have a more difficult time achieving a consensus on approving
research protocols.15 9
Attorney Judith Cregan has recorded a number of "serious problems"'
'6
with FDA and NIH regulation of human gene therapy, including
"concerns about patient safety, confidentiality of patient information,
agency effectiveness, a lack of clear, adequate oversight for the industry,
and a need for protection of proprietary information." 6 She proposes five
specific changes that would centralize and improve the regulatory
framework for human gene therapy. She suggests that Congress should:
(1) establish a standing subcommittee to monitor gene therapy; (2) place
the RAC 62 under the direct control of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and make its directives binding on both the NIH and the FDA;
(3) increase the budget of the FDA to improve oversight of gene therapy
trials; (4) appoint independent advocates for the subjects of gene therapy
trials; and (5) prohibit strict products liability for design defects in human
gene therapy products. 63 An alternative possibility is to turn to a scheme
of legislative preemption, as set forth in the following section.
III. LEGISLATIVE PREEMPTION
Many other nations of the world are suspicious of genetic technology
and have expressed this hostility by enacting a host of laws that would
157. Id.
158. See id. at 599-600.
159. See id. at 600.
160. Cregan, supra note 1, at 264.
161. Id. at 278.
162. The RAC is the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee of NIH. This
body "approves novel protocols and monitors the protocols and adverse reactions
for researchers using NIH grant money." Id. at 263.
163. See id. at 284-87. Professor Baram also suggests a number of reforms that
the FDA and the NIH should implement in their oversight of human clinical trials
of gene therapy. See generally Baram, supra note 1.
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limit or ban its use. 6 Because genetic engineering of plants and animals
has proceeded much further than human genetic engineering - a number
of genetically engineered crops have already come to market, while no
human gene therapy treatments have been approved - it is appropriate to
consider, by analogy, legislative reaction to these agricultural products.
For example, France, Luxemburg and Austria have banned the
cultivation of genetically engineered corn. 65 Furthermore, in a decision
that is potentially devastating to American agriculture, the European
Parliament, in Regulation 98-1139, requires all products containing
genetically engineered ingredients to carry a label stating that the product
is "genetically modified." '66  The practical effect of this labeling
requirement would be to drive imported American food from the
market. 167
Professor Marsha Echols, who has written about the effects of cultural
values on the regulation of genetic engineering, notes, "the U.S. regulatory
approach permits a great deal of industry self-regulation, while Europeans
usually adopt a more detailed regulatory scheme."' 68 In general, Europe
embraces the precautionary principle,'69 that is, the idea that new products
164. See generally Enrique Freire de Oliveire Souza, Genetically Modified
Plants: A Need for International Regulations, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. LAW
129 (2000).
165. Id.
166. See id. at note 51; Matthew Franken, Fear of Frankenfoods: A Better
Labeling Standard for Genetically Modified Foods, 1 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV.
153, 168 (2000).
167.
[C]onsumers who have little to fear about GM foods may avoid healthy,
tasty, fresh foods that are cheaper to produce and involve the use of fewer
herbicides or pesticides simply because the food has a GM label. This is
especially relevant in Europe, where consumers have a preference for
foods produced through traditional means. Even traditional foods
produced through genetic engineering, such as cheese produced by cows
treated with rBST, or produce such as Roundup Ready soybeans or Bt
Corn, are likely to be shunned by consumers because of the label.
Id. at 173.
168. Quoted in Souza, supra note 164, at 143.
169. "Underlying the swelling support for the 'precautionary principle' in
Europe is a protest against the high information costs imbedded in the culture of
regulation by the legalistic bureaucracy in the United States." Elliott, supra note
130, at 253.
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or processes should not be adopted until proven to be safe. 170  The
drawback to the precautionary principle, of course, is that the safety of
genetic engineering cannot be determined in advance. Most other nations,
however, agree with the European approach.171 One hundred thirty-eight
nations (not including the United States) have negotiated an International
Biosafety Protocol that would govern the export, use and sale of
transgenic products.1 7 ' This protocol would allow nations to exclude a
product and subject it to testing until a determination can be made as to its
risks. 73 The protocol also includes notice and labeling requirements.
In contrast, the American position is consistent with the scientific model
of regulation that dominates in the United States. The United States
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture responded to the European
actions by noting that the United States "base[s] decisions on rigorous
analysis and sound scientific principles. 1 75  The United States trade
representatives and the biotech industry assert that since there is no
proven scientific basis for believing that genetically modified foods are
176harmful, that any ban is unscientific and amounts to trade protectionism.
As a result, the United States has called for trade negotiations to ensure




There is precedent supporting the American position. In 1997, the
World Trade Organization held that the European ban on importation of
beef from cows treated with synthetic growth hormones was not based on
"scientific evidence, risk assessment, or relevant international standards,"
170. One formulation of the precautionary principle is the Wingspread
Consensus Statement, drafted by environmental activists, which states that
"[w]hen an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment,
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically." Jonathan H. Adler, More
Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed
International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173, 194 (2000).
171. "The precautionary principle has become a staple of international
environmental law." Id.
172. See Holly Saigo, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Negotiation of the
Biosafety Protocol, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 779 (2000).
173. See id. at 811.
174. See id. at 812-14.
175. Souza, supra note 164, at 142.
176. See Saigo, supra note 172, at 811.
177. Sean Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 491 (1999).
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and the European Union was ordered to pay over $100 million to the
United States.7 8
What does the analogy to agricultural regulation tell us about regulating
research into the human genome? At least this - the United States, an
individualistic society with a capitalistic economy, is likely to continue to
approach these issues from a rights or a scientific regulation perspective,
while more communitarian societies that have a stronger commitment to
traditional values will opt for a stricter regulatory regime or for legislative
preemption. National preferences for different models of regulation will
hamper the development of a rational and comprehensive scheme of
international regulation of biotechnology.'
The United States Congress is presently considering whether to
categorically prohibit human cloning.'9 Almost all researchers and
scholars agree that because of the high failure rate it is premature to
attempt to clone human beings and that irresponsible experimentation
should be halted. However, there are some responsible scholars who have
suggested that human cloning may ultimately be beneficial in certain
limited kinds of situations,8 for example, for procreative purposes to
allow an infertile couple to have a child who is genetically solely related to
one of them'82 or for therapeutic purposes to create cells, tissue and organs
for transplantation.'83
Should the United States enact a ban on the cloning of human beings?
In a larger sense, when is legislative preemption justified? Deontological
ethics requires society to ban experiments and practices that exploit
human beings, while teleological ethics requires society to ban
178. See Souza, supra note 164, at 170-71.
179. To solve this problem, Professor Sean Murphy recommends the creation of
an "epistic community" from many nations to develop "convergent policies and
expectations" for the international regulation of biotechnology. Sean D. Murphy,
Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 139 (2001)
180. See Shadid, supra note 153; and Ashutosh Bhagwat, Cloning and
Federalism, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1133, 1135 (2002).
181. See generally John A. Robertson, Why Human Reproductive Cloning
Should Not in All Cases Be Prohibited, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 35 (2000);
and R. George Wright, Second Thoughts: How Human Cloning Can Promote
Human Dignity, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2000).
182. See id. at 37-8. Another potent, though perhaps misguided, parental
request came from the father of a deceased eight-year-old: "I want my son back."
See Lauren Neergaard, Cloning Raises Confusion of Risks, COLUMBIAN, April 3,
2001, at A4.
183. See Shadid, supra note 153.
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experiments and practices where the risks of research are
disproportionately great in relation to the expected benefits.
CONCLUSION
Each of the three legal frameworks discussed in this article performs a
valuable function and each should play a role in the regulation of genetic
technology. The common law must continue to hold the medical
community to high levels of professional competence and protect patients
and research subjects under the principle of informed consent. Additional
antidiscrimination and genetic privacy laws must be adopted because the
Americans With Disabilities Act is not sufficiently specific to protect
individuals from genetic discrimination in employment or insurance. The
courts should acknowledge the constitutional rights of patients, parents,
subjects and researchers to be free of laws that infringe upon personal
choices, practices that constitute slavery and regulations that infringe upon
the right to inquire. The "Coordinated Framework" of administrative
regulation in the United States has failed to create a thorough, consistent
and rational scheme of regulation. It is time for Congress to adopt
enabling legislation that expressly establishes administrative jurisdiction
over the biotech industry, centralizes administrative authority and targets
the specific concerns created by genetic technology. Administrative
agencies must be given more comprehensive power to oversee genetic
engineering and must institute stricter protections for human safety.
Finally, society should legislatively forbid genetic expreriments or
practices that exploit people or that create an unacceptable risk of harm to
research subjects.
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